Data Centre Investments Bad Deals

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and K Kuhaneetha Bai

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Oct 28 2025 (IPS) - Opposition to data centres (DCs) has been rapidly spreading internationally due to their fast-growing resource demands. DCs have been proliferating quickly, driven by the popularity of artificial intelligence (AI).

Who are data centres for?

Already, the AI boom has overwhelmed other ‘cloud’ uses and drives the rapid growth of DCs, imposing fast-expanding resource demands. This has triggered a bipartisan public backlash in the US due to higher energy, water, and land use, as well as rising prices.

In October 2024, McKinsey projected that global energy demand by DCs would rise between 19% and 22% annually through 2030, reaching an annual demand between 171 and 219 gigawatts.

This greatly exceeds the “current demand of 60 GW”. “To avoid a [supply] deficit, at least twice the [DC] capacity built since 2000 would have to be built in less than a quarter of the time”!

As tech companies are not paying for the additional energy generation capacity, consumers and host governments are, whether they benefit from AI or not.

As DCs increasingly faced growing pushback in the North, developers have turned to developing countries, outsourcing problems to poorer nations with limited resources.

Understanding these energy- and water-guzzling facilities is necessary to better protect economies, societies, communities, and their environments.

Energy needs

With growing corporate and consumer demand for AI, DC growth will continue, and even occasionally accelerate.

Increased AI usage will significantly increase energy and water consumption, accelerating planetary heating both directly and indirectly.

As demand for AI and DCs increases, supporting computers will require significantly more electricity. This will generate heat, needing the use of water and energy for cooling. Much energy used by DCs, from 38% to 50%, is for cooling.

Electricity generation, whether from fossil fuels or nuclear fission, requires more cooling than renewable energy sources such as photovoltaic solar panels or wind turbines.

A small-scale DC with 500 to 2,000 servers consumes one to five megawatts (MW). For tech giants, a ‘hyperscale’ DC, hosting tens of thousands of servers, consumes 20 to over 100MW, like a small city.

Data centres not cool

As the popular focus is on DCs’ enormous energy requirements, their massive water needs to cool equipment tend to be ignored, understated and overlooked.

Locating new DCs in developing countries will further heat local microclimates and the planetary atmosphere. Worse still, heat is more environmentally threatening in the tropics, where ambient temperatures are higher.

Establishing more DCs will inevitably crowd out existing and other possible uses of freshwater supplies, besides reducing local groundwater aquifers.

Unsurprisingly, DC investors rarely warn host governments about the amount of locally supplied energy and water required.

DCs require much freshwater to cool servers and routers. In 2023, Google alone used almost 23 billion litres to cool DCs. In cooling systems using evaporation, cold water is used to absorb severe heat, releasing steam into the atmosphere.

Closed-loop cooling systems absorb heat using piped-in water, while air-cooled chillers cool down hot water. Cooled water recirculated for cooling requires less water but more energy to chill hot water.

Investors expect subsidies

Like other prospective investors, DCs have relocated to areas where host governments have been more generous and less demanding.

Led by US President Trump’s powerful ‘tech bros’, many foreign investors have profited from subsidised energy, cheap land and water, and other special incentives.

Prospective host governments compete to offer tax and other incentives, such as subsidised energy and water, to attract foreign direct investment in DCs.

The US pressured Malaysia and Thailand to stop Chinese firms from using them as an “export-control backdoor” for its AI chips. Washington alleges that DCs outside China buy chips to train its AI for military purposes. So far, only Malaysia has complied.

This limits Chinese firms’ access to such chips. Washington claims that Chinese substitutes for US-made chips are inferior and seeks to protect US technology from China.

High-tech DC jobs?

Data centres are emerging everywhere, but not many jobs will be created. Advocates claim DCs will provide high-tech jobs.

DCs are largely self-operating, requiring minimal human intervention, except for maintenance, which they determine independently. Thus, job creation is minimised.

Construction and installation work will be temporary, with most managerial functions being performed remotely from headquarters. A Georgetown University report estimates only 27% of DC jobs are ‘technical’.

While the DC discourse mainly focuses on foreign investments, there is little discussion on growing national desires for data sovereignty.

Acceding to so many foreign requests will inevitably block national capacity ambitions to develop end-to-end DC capabilities and not just host them.

Thus far, there is limited interest in the ‘afterlife’ of DCs, such as what happens after they have outlived their purpose, or the disposal of waste materials.

Higher energy and water costs, subsidies, tax incentives and other problems caused by DCs are hardly offset by their modest employment and other benefits.

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• Trump’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Tariffs

• Western Climate Hypocrisy Exposed by NATO Energy Policy

• America First Deepens World Stagnation

• Ethics for artificial intelligence

• Developing Countries Losing Out To Digital Giants

Available online at: Data Centre Investments Bad Deals

Financing for Development Priorities Today

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jan 7 2025 (IPS) - The forthcoming fourth United Nations Financing for Development conference must address developing countries’ major financial challenges. Recent setbacks to sustainable development and climate action make FfD4 all the more critical.

FfD4

The FfD4 conference, months away, will mainly be due to efforts led by the G77, the caucus of developing countries in the UN system. The G77 started with 77 UN member states and has since expanded to over 130.

The 1944 Bretton Woods conference outcome was primarily a compromise between the US and the UK. In 1971, when its Bretton Woods obligations threatened to undermine its privileges, President Richard Nixon refused to honour the US pledge to deliver an ounce of gold for US$35.

Over two decades later, President Bill Clinton promised a new international financial architecture. It rejected Professor Robert Triffin’s characterisation of international monetary arrangements after the early 1970s as an incoherent ‘non-system’.

Foreign aid

Several issues are emerging as G77 priorities for FfD4. In 1970, wealthy nations at the UN agreed to provide 0.7% of their national income annually as official development assistance (ODA).

This was much lower than the 2% initially proposed by the World Council of Churches and others. Only 0.3% has been delivered in recent years, or less than half the promise.

Most ODA conditions reflect the priorities of donors, not recipient countries. New aid definitions, conditions, and practices undermine ‘aid effectiveness’, reducing what developing nations receive.

Despite breaking its ODA promises, the new European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to contribute 0.25% of national income to Ukraine. By early December 2024, Europe had provided well over half the USD260 billion in aid to Ukraine!

Some European nations now insist that only mitigation qualifies as climate finance. Although most developing countries are tropical and struggling to cope with planetary heating, little assistance is available for adaptation.

Debt

More recently, developing countries’ new debt has been more commercial and conditional but less concessional. With the transition to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the World Bank encouraged much more commercial borrowing with its new slogan, ‘from billions to trillions’.

Following the 2008 global financial crisis, Western countries adopted unconventional monetary policies, eschewing fiscal efforts. Quantitative easing enabled much more borrowing, which grew until 2022.

However, most Western governments did not borrow much. Some private interests borrowed heavily, often for unproductive purposes, with some using cheap funds to finance shareholder buyouts to get more wealth.

Meanwhile, many developing countries went on borrowing binges as creditors pushed debt in developing countries in various ways. Rapidly mounting government debt would soon become problematic.

From early 2022 until mid-2024, interest rates rose sharply, ostensibly to counter inflation. The US Fed and European Central Bank raised interest rates in concert, triggering massive capital outflows from developing countries with the poorest worst affected.

Taxation

The Global South has long wanted the UN to lead negotiations on international taxation arrangements to provide more financial resources for development. However, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rich nations’ club has long undermined developing countries’ interests.

The OECD achieved this by misleading finance ministries in developing countries. It bypassed foreign ministries that had long worked well together on contentious Global South issues. With the OECD making up new rules for the world, developing country finance ministries signed on to a biased tax proposal on which they were nominally consulted.

At the FfD3 conference in mid-2015, the OECD blocked Global South efforts to advance international tax cooperation. An independent international commission proposed a minimum international corporate income tax rate of 25%.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen counter-proposed a 21% rate, the US minimum rate. However, at the G7 meeting he was hosting, Boris Johnson pushed this down to 15% while adding exemptions, reducing likely revenue.

Instead of distributing revenue as with a corporate income tax on profits from production, the OECD proposed revenue sharing according to consumption spending, much like a sales tax.

Poor countries would receive little as their population can afford to spend much less, even if they produce much at low wages. Rather than progressively redistribute, OECD international corporate income tax revenue distribution would be regressive.

Dollar

The US dollar remains the world’s principal currency for international transactions. US Treasury bond sales enable this, subsidising the world’s largest economy. Trump recently threatened the BRICS and others considering de-dollarization.

The leading BRICS proponents of de-dollarisation, Brazil and South Africa, have failed to persuade the other BRICS to de-dollarize. Instead, China’s central bank has issued dollar-denominated bonds for Saudi Arabia.

Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) should be issued regularly to augment discretionary IMF financial resources. This can be done without Congressional approval, as happened after the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 outbreak.

Such resources can be committed to the SDGs and climate finance.

But this cannot happen without collective action by the Global South seriously mobilising behind pacifist, developmental non-alignment. Inclusive and sustainable development is impossible in a world at war.

Available online here: Financing for Development Priorities Today

Climate hypocrisy ensures global warming

Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram

SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR: Rich country governments claim the high moral ground on climate action. But many deny their far greater responsibility for both historic and contemporary greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, once acknowledged by the Kyoto Protocol.

Climate injustice

Worse, responsibility has not been matched by commensurate efforts, especially by the largest rich economies in the G7, which dominates the G20. Its continued control of international economic resources and policymaking blocks progress on climate justice.

“That is the greatest injustice of climate change: that those who bear the least responsibility for climate change are the ones who will suffer the most”, says Mary Robinson, former Eire President and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

On a per capita basis, the US and close allies – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and Canada – produce more than a hundred times the planet-warming greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of some African countries.

The African population produced about 1.1 metric tonnes of carbon (dioxide equivalent) emissions per person in 2019, under a quarter of the 4.7 tonnes global average. The US emitted 16.1 tonnes – nearly four times the global average.

GHG emissions accumulate over time and trap heat, warming the planet. The US has emitted over a quarter of all GHG emissions since the 1750s, while Europe accounts for 33%. By contrast, Africa, South America and India contributed about 3% each, while China contributed 12.7%.

Wealth inequalities worsen climate injustice. The world’s richest 5% were responsible for 37% of GHG emissions growth during 1990-2015, while the bottom half of the world’s population accounted for 7%!

Poor regions and people take the brunt of global warming. The tropical zone is much more vulnerable to rapid climate change. Most of these countries and communities bear little responsibility for the GHG emissions worsening global warming, but also have the least means to cope and protect themselves.

Thus, climate justice demands wealthy nations – most responsible for cumulative and current GHG emissions – not only reduce the harm they cause, but also help those with less means to cope.

Rich hypocrisy

Wealthy countries have done little to keep their 2009 promises to provide US$100 billion annually to help developing countries. Most climate finance has been earmarked for mitigation. But this ignores their needs and priorities, as developing countries need help to adapt to climate change and to cope with losses and damages due to global warming.

The OECD club of rich countries has been criticized for exaggerating climate finance, but acknowledges, “Australia, Japan and the United States consider financing for high-efficiency coal plants as a form of climate finance.”

It reports climate finance of US$79.6bn in 2019, but these figures are hotly contested. However, ‘commercial credit’ is typically not concessional. But when it is, it implies official subsidies for “bankable”, “for profit” projects.

Many also doubt much of this funding is truly additional, and not just diverted (‘repurposed’) from other ends. Private finance also rarely goes where it is most needed while increasing debt burdens for borrowers.

Leading from behind

At the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow in November 2021, US President Joe Biden described climate change as “an existential threat to human existence” and pledged to cut US emissions by up to 51% by 2030.

Biden had claimed his ‘Build Back Better’ (BBB) package of proposed social and climate spending would be a cornerstone of restoring international trust in the US commitment to stem global warming.

At the G7 Summit in June 2021, Biden announced his vision of a “Build Back Better World” (B3W) would define the G7 alternative to China’s multitrillion USD Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

All this was premised on US ability to lead from the front, with momentum growing once BBB became law. But his legislative package has stalled. Unable to attract the needed votes in the Senate, BBB is ‘dead in the water’.

Putting on a brave face, US Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer promises to bring the legislation to a vote early next year. But with their party’s declining political fortunes, likely ‘horse-trading’ to pass the bill will almost certainly further undermine Biden’s promises.

Meanwhile, breaking his 2020 campaign promise, Biden approved nearly 900 more permits to drill on public land in 2021, more than President Trump in 2017. While exhorting others to cut fossil fuel reliance, his administration is now urging US companies and allies to produce more, invoking Ukraine war sanctions.

Aid laggard

At COP26, Biden promised to help developing nations reduce carbon emissions, pledging to double US climate change aid. But even this is still well short of its proportionate share of the grossly inadequate US$100bn yearly rich nations had pledged in 2009 in concessional climate finance for developing countries.

Considering its national income and cumulative emissions, the US should provide at least US$43–50bn in climate finance annually. Others insist the US owes the developing world much more, considering their needs and damages due to US emissions, e.g., suggesting US$800bn over the decade to 2030.

In 2017-18, the US delivered US$10bn to the pledged US$100bn annual climate finance – less than Japan’s US$27bn, Germany’s US$20bn and France’s US$15bn, despite the US economy being larger than all three combined.

President Obama pledged US$3bn to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) – the UN’s flagship climate finance initiative – but delivered only US$1bn. Trump totally repudiated this modest pledge.

At the April 2021 Earth Day leaders’ summit, Biden vowed to nearly double Obama’s pledge to US$5.7bn, with US$1.5bn for adaptation. But even this amount is far short of what the US should contribute, given its means and total emissions.

After the European Commission president highlighted this in September 2021, Biden vowed to again double the US contribution to US$11.4bn yearly by 2024, boasting this would “make the US a leader in international climate finance”.

At COP26, the US cited this increased GCF promise to block developing countries’ call for a share of revenue from voluntary bilateral carbon trading. The US has also opposed developing countries’ call for a funding facility to help vulnerable nations cope with loss and damage due to global warming.

Worse, the US Congress has approved only US$1bn for international climate finance for 2022 – only US$387m more than in the Trump era. At that rate, it would take until 2050 to get to US$11.4bn. Unsurprisingly, Biden made only passing mention of climate and energy in his last State of the Union address.