Trade Liberalisation Undermines Development

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram 

ZAMBOANGA, Philippines, Feb 10 2026 (IPS) - Despite lacking both evidence and theory, many economists claim trade liberalisation accelerates development. But only a few economies have gained many jobs from external market access.

Instead, most economies have experienced greater deindustrialisation and food insecurity, besides deepening their vulnerability to recent tariff threats.

Multilateral trade liberalisation

In conventional trade theory, gains from trade liberalisation are mainly one-time increases in output and exports due to static comparative advantage.

Post-World War Two (WWII) US foreign policy transformed multilateral relations and transnational institutions, including international economic governance.

With the growing power of transnational corporations, many multilateral institutions, including the United Nations system, have been reconfigured or marginalised.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a ‘second-best’ compromise after the US Congress vetoed the creation of the International Trade Organisation, despite widespread international enthusiasm for the 1948 Havana Charter.

Almost half a century later, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995, following the 1994 Marrakesh Declaration concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.

Trade mahaguru Jagdish Bhagwati argued that multilateral trade has been undermined by plurilateral and bilateral arrangements favouring dominant partners.

With the era of trade liberalisation essentially over since the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC), free trade advocacy has received a new lease of life from mythmaking about the ‘pre-Trump’ era.

Uneven, mixed effects

Mainstream trade theory does not entertain the possibility of ‘unequal exchange’, however defined.

Nor does it even incorporate Bhagwati’s notion of ‘immiserising growth’ when productivity gains reduce prices for consumers, rather than increase producers’ earnings.

The three decades of trade liberalisation from the 1980s saw slower, but more volatile growth than the post-WWII quarter-century termed the ‘Golden Age’. More recently, stagnationist tendencies have dominated since the GFC.

With trade liberalisation, many developing countries have experienced greater food insecurity and deindustrialisation, as the manufacturing shares of their national income shrank.

Much import-substituting industrialisation after WWII or independence has since collapsed. Besides resource processing, very few new industries have emerged in Africa.

‘Aid for Trade’ for poorer developing countries implicitly acknowledges trade liberalisation’s adverse effects by mitigating some of them. Why then should they abandon protectionism if they need to be compensated for doing so?

Wealthy nations have also insisted that developing countries end manufacturing tariffs. But as Dani Rodrik has quipped, why rich nations “need to be bribed by poor countries to do what is good for them is an enduring mystery”.

African nations and Caribbean and Pacific small island developing states enjoyed preferential access to European markets, which full multilateral trade liberalisation would eliminate.

Such preferences for Sub-Saharan Africa have pitted African against Asian least developed countries, undermining the collective negotiating strengths of both.

Many countries had expected the current Doha Round to eliminate rich nations’ producer subsidies, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, but that has not happened.

Cutting farm support in the North could make food agriculture in developing countries more viable, but would also raise food import prices in the interim.

World Bank ‘structural adjustment’ programmes and IMF fiscal discipline requirements have undermined rural infrastructure and productivity, setting back smallholder agriculture in most developing countries.

Setbacks, not gains

Trade liberalisation also reduces tariff revenue. Such losses have hurt developing nations, especially the poorest, for whom tariffs often accounted for up to half of all tax revenue.

Such revenue cuts severely undermined the fiscal means of developing nations, crucial for government spending and investment, including for development and welfare.

Most governments are unable to replace lost tariff revenue with new or higher taxes. Meanwhile, more borrowing to offset lost tariff revenue has worsened indebtedness.

Trade liberalisation advocates are typically vague about how it is supposed to raise exports, incomes, and tax revenue, besides compensating for lost tariff revenue.

Instead, tax burdens typically become more regressive as overall tax revenue declines. Real consumption is supposed to rise as import prices fall with lower tariffs, but could also decline due to increasing consumption taxes.

Less policy space

Trade liberalisation has also reduced available development policy tools, especially those relating to trade, investment, and industrialisation.

The constraints imposed by trade liberalisation and investment agreements have generally limited the scope for and potential of development policy initiatives.

The actual role and impact of trade policy for growth and employment remain moot. But there are no analytical reasons or robust empirical evidence that trade liberalisation per se ensures sustainable development.

World Bank and most other studies acknowledged modest, if not negative, net gains for most developing countries from any realistically achievable outcome.

It is often ignored that realistic expectations of gains from trade liberalisation rely crucially on a strong positive export supply response.

However, such a response is unlikely when internationally competitive, productive and export capacities do not already exist, as in most developing countries, especially the poorest.

Hence, most of the Global South has not been able to overcome the worst consequences of trade liberalisation to achieve sustainable development.

In any case, the WTO Doha Round talks were ended by rich nations in 2015.

With the increasingly blatant self-interested contravention of WTO rules by the US, European and other wealthy nations, developing countries may best enhance their development prospects by reverting to GATT rules.

This would allow them to opt in, as appropriate, rather than resign themselves to the uniform ‘one size fits all’ WTO rules and regulations, regardless of context, circumstances, capacities and capabilities.

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Available online at: Trade Liberalisation Undermines Development

Economic Dogma Blocks Pragmatic Policies

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram 

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jan 19 2026 (IPS) - After condemning pragmatic responses to the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, the West pursued similar policies in response to the 2008 global financial crisis without acknowledging its own mistakes.

Politicised exchange rates

After US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker sharply raised interest rates from late 1979 to curb inflation, the dollar’s value strengthened despite deepening stagnation.

US exports could barely compete internationally, particularly with Germany and Japan. During his first term, Trump initially pursued a strong dollar policy, which undermined exports and encouraged imports.

The September 1985 ‘Plaza Accord’ among the G7 grouping of the world’s largest economies, held at New York’s Plaza Hotel, agreed that the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark must both appreciate sharply against the US dollar.

The ‘strong yen’ period, or endaka in Japanese, ensued for a decade until mid-1995. This made Japanese imports less competitive, enabling the Reagan era boom.

By accelerating reunification with the East and the new euro currency, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl prevented the mark strengthening as much as the yen.

Thus, Germany avoided the Japanese catastrophe after its decades-long post-war miracle ended abruptly with the disastrous 1989 Big Bang financial reforms.

Liberalising capital flows

As the IMF urged national authorities to abandon capital controls, East Asians borrowed dollars, expecting to repay later on better terms.

Meanwhile, the dollar only stopped weakening after the US allowed Japan to reverse yen appreciation in mid-1995.

Under Managing Director Michel Camdessus, the IMF began pushing capital account liberalisation. This contradicted the intent of the Fund’s sixth Article of Agreement, affirming national authorities’ right to manage their capital accounts.

Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Camdessus’ IMF preached the ostensible virtues of capital account liberalisation.

East Asian emerging financial markets were initially delighted by the significant capital inflows before mid-1997. After the strong yen decade, the US dollar appreciated from mid-1995.

When financial inflows reversed after mid-1997, some East Asian monetary authorities were unable to cope and turned to the IMF for emergency funding.

Many paths to crises

The Asian financial crisis is typically dated from 2 July 1997, when the Thai baht was ‘floated’ and its value quickly fell without central bank support. The ensuing panic quickly spread like contagion across national boundaries via financial markets.

Financial investors – in Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, London and New York – hastily withdrew their funds, often mindlessly following perceived ‘market leaders’ without knowing why, like animal herds in panic.

Funds fled economies in the region, like frightened audiences in a dark theatre hearing a fire alarm. Capital even fled the Philippines, which had received little finance, because it was in Southeast Asia, the ‘wrong neighbourhood’.

After earlier celebrating Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand as ‘East Asian miracle’ economies, confidence in Southeast Asian investments fell suddenly.

Central banks in the region were sceptical of IMF prescriptions but believed they had little choice but to comply.

Press photographs showed Camdessus standing sternly, with arms folded like a displeased schoolmaster, over the Indonesian President bowing deeply to sign the IMF agreement.

This humiliating image probably expedited Soeharto’s shock resignation soon after, in mid-1998, over three decades after he seized power in a brutal military putsch in September 1965.

Following an earlier financial crisis, a 1989 Malaysian law had prohibited some risky banking and financial practices, but the authorities sought to attract foreign investments into its stock market.

Thailand had become vulnerable by allowing borrowers direct access to foreign banks through the Bangkok International Banking Facility and its provincial counterpart.

Debtors could thus bypass central bank regulation and supervision. The Thai currency float prompted massive funds outflows from the country.

As market confidence waned, funds fled Malaysia’s bourse, triggering a massive collapse in the currency’s value against the dollar, which had steadily weakened against the yen between 1985 and 1995.

Following massive capital outflows, Malaysia finally introduced capital controls on outflows from September 1998, fourteen months after the crisis began!

The controls enabled Malaysia to stabilise its currency and the economy temporarily, but also ended the earlier decade of accelerated industrialisation and growth.

Learning from experience

Rather than acknowledge and address the worsening problem due to earlier capital account liberalisation, the Fund made things worse with its prescriptions.

It insisted on keeping capital accounts open and raising interest rates to reverse outflows. This slowed economic growth as borrowing – and hence, both spending and investing – became more costly.

As investment and spending are necessary for economic growth, IMF prescriptions exacerbated the problems instead of providing a solution.

The East Asian financial crisis was undoubtedly avoidable. Experience has shown that financial markets and capital flows do not function as mainstream theories claim.

Thus, financial dogma and its influence on economic theory and policy obscured more realistic understanding of how markets actually operate and the ability to develop more pragmatic and appropriate policy alternatives.

History never fully repeats itself. But better policymaking for financial crisis avoidance and recovery will only emerge from more informed, historically grounded analysis.

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• Ideology and Dogma Ensure Policy Disaster

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Available online at: Economic Dogma Blocks Pragmatic Policies